Part VI: AI in attack and defense

Claims about AI in cybersecurity require separate evidence for attacker assistance, defensive value, and deployment cost.

Claims that AI helps an attacker or defender need a comparison with work performed without that assistance. Chapter 17 separates demonstrated capabilities from evidence of actual attacks. Chapter 18 measures defensive benefit and errors while retaining analyst judgment and service authorization. Chapter 19 compares model and hosting choices for a fixed task, required quality, permissions, and operating budget. A result from one task or deployment does not settle the other comparisons.

Three chapter panels show attack claim assessment, a read-only defensive assistant with analyst review and a separate action service, and three deployment options feeding a comparison record; arrows from all three panels meet at a decision owner above live monitoring.
Figure 1: Claims about AI-assisted attacks, evidence about defensive assistance, and deployment comparisons answer different questions and must remain separate. Their records converge at an organizational decision owner, who can authorize conditional deployment and continued monitoring without giving the assistant direct authority over actions.

Chapters in this part

  • AI-assisted attacks: Different evidence supports capability, observed AI use, prevalence, and measured improvement, guiding controls for verified attack paths.
  • Evaluating AI for defense: A defensive AI assessment measures useful security work while keeping human judgment, data access, and action authority visible.
  • Comparing AI deployment options: A deployment comparison holds task, data access, quality target, and action limits constant, then measures results and full operating cost for each option.